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A selected history of expectation bias in physics
Monwhea Jeng∗
Physics Department, Box 1654, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL, 62025
The beliefs of physicists can bias their results towards their expectations in a number of ways. We
survey a variety of historical cases of expectation bias in observations, experiments and calculations.
It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has
data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit
theories, instead of theories to suit facts.
Sherlock Holmes1
But are we sure of our observational facts? Scientific
men are rather fond of saying pontifically that one
ought to be quite sure of one’s observational facts
before embarking on theory. Fortunately those who
give this advice do not practice what they preach.
Observation and theory get on best when they
are mixed together, both helping one another in
the pursuit of truth. It is a good rule to not put
overmuch confidence in a theory until it has been
confirmed by observation. I hope I shall not shock
the experimental physicists too much if I add that it
is also a good rule not to put overmuch confidence
in the observational results that are put forward
until they have been confirmed by theory.
Sir Arthur S. Eddington2
I. INTRODUCTION
Under an idealized view of science, the theoretical
beliefs of experimenters should have no effect on what
results are obtained. Theoretical beliefs can influence
what experiments are done, and how they are interpreted
and recieved, but the actual results are facts determined
purely by nature. But in practice, one can worry that
even honest and careful experimenters might still some-
how transfer their biases to their end results.
Sherlock Holmes warns against this by forbidding any
theorizing in advance of the experiment. But it is difficult
to see how this is possible, let along desirable. And when
we remember that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the author
of Sherlock Holmes, uncritically accepted, and indeed ac-
tively promoted, the “data” that fairies had been seen
and photographed in Cottingley, England3, we begin to
think that perhaps not all “experimental facts” should
be accepted and treated equally. Eddington’s character-
ization of the complex interplay between theory and ex-
periment seems to come closer to the truth. Perhaps the
facts from experiments and observations are not always
simple “facts,” to be accepted at face value.
Expectation bias is well-known, and widely discussed
in the “softer” sciences, that study humans, such as psy-
chology and medicine. But what role does it play in
“hard” sciences, such as physics? The impression one
gets from the history in physics textbooks is that it plays
virtually no role, but this may be misleading. Because
textbooks have as their primary goal to teach physics,
extended discussions of how this physics was arrived at
can seem like pointless and potentially confusing diver-
sions; the emphasis is on how careful and correct rea-
soning leads to correct results, even if that reasoning is
retrospective, and ahistorical. Convoluted reasoning that
was actually followed is replaced with the clearer reason-
ing that “should” have been followed. Many readers will
doubtlessly be surprised to discover that Planck was not
led to quantization in an attempt to fix an “ultravio-
let catastrophe” discovered by Rayleigh4,5, that Rømer
never calculated a value for the speed of light6, and that
Einstein was not primarily motivated by the Michelson-
Morley experiment in his invention of special relativity7.
These, and other examples, are discussed in the reviews
by Brush and Whitaker4,5. While this systematic bias
in textbooks is understandable, it unfortunately tends to
eliminate cases of expectation bias. Here, we consider
some historical cases where beliefs of physicists have in-
fluenced their results.
II. OBSERVATIONS
When human perception is at its limits, even ba-
sic observations are unreliable, and may be biased to-
wards what the observer expects to see. Van Helden
surveyed the history of early telescopic observations of
Saturn8. While most observers today, even with very
low-resolution pictures, see a planet with rings, early ob-
servers echoed Galileo’s first observations, and saw and
reported on a planet with two giant moons, one on each
side. Van Helden’s analysis convincingly shows that the
inaccurate drawings of Saturn came not from poor tele-
scopes, but from the influence of Galileo’s first reports on
later observers. Van Helden traces the evolution of ob-
servations from a “two moon” phase to a “ring” phase.
Another example can be seen in the N-rays of the early
1900’s9. From 1903 to 1906, roughly 300 papers on N-
rays were written by 100 scientists and doctors through-
out France, describing in detail the properties of N-rays,
as deduced by the faint lines they produced on white sur-
faces in dark rooms. However, many researchers were un-
able to see these lines. While there were early suspicions,
it was not until several years had passed that the scientific
community came to decide that the positive results arose
from experimenters convincing themselves that they saw
2faint lines and flashes that were not really there. In fact,
anyone staring at a white surface under such conditions
long enough will start to see dark spots and lines, and the
judgment as to what constituted a flash turned out to be
rather subjective. While this case has been used as an
example of “pathological science,”10 it is not clear how
to distinguish pathological science from normal science
in error.
As Brewer points out, in almost all cases like these,
the observations required were at the limits of human
perception, and it is in these sorts of cases where we can
expect subconscious biases to seep in11. When the per-
ceptual data are unambiguous, these sorts of problems
will generally not occur; no experimenter is likely to re-
port that apples fall up. However, it is not always clear
what constitutes “unambiguous” perceptual data. Bisson
and Dennen noted that while Newton’s experiments with
color used a prism under conditions where spectral lines
should have been clearly visible, Newton never reported
seeing such lines12. Boring argued that Newton’s pre-
suppositions essentially prevented him from seeing these
spectral lines13. Similarly, it is striking that there are no
European records of the 1054 supernova. This supernova
was visible to the naked eye by daylight for several weeks,
and at night for over a year, and appears in Chinese and
Japanese records. It has often argued that Europeans
failed to record and discuss the supernova because of
ideological committments to an unchanging universe14.
These arguments are necessarily speculative, since it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions from the absence of
records, but the lack of reports of such a dramatic event
is rather striking.
But one does not need to rely on historical cases to see
this observational bias in practice. Physics Education
Research has shown that students in physics classes do
not always see what they are “supposed to” in demon-
strations. Instead, students sometimes see what they ex-
pect to see, even when the demonstration is supposed
to provide a dramatic illustration of a counterintuitive
result. Redish describes how his students “saw” a mar-
ble leaving a curved track continue to curve, instead of
seeing the straight line motion that they were supposed
to observe15. Gunstone and White reported similar re-
sults when studying student observations of experiments
on gravity; what the students saw was highly correlated
with what they expected to see16.
However, even when the perceptual data is completely
clear, other errors can occur. For example, when data
is recorded by hand, it may simply be misrecorded. It
might be thought that these errors, while regrettable,
would have no overall effect in any direction. However,
in 1978 Rosenthal reviewed 21 psychology studies that al-
lowed analysis of errors in recording. Subject responses
recorded by human observers were compared to those
recorded by mechanical devices. Roughly 140,000 obser-
vations, by over 300 observers, were looked at. Rosen-
thal found that about two-thirds of the recording er-
rors favored the hypothesis of the observer, significantly
greater than the 50% that would be expected if the ob-
servers were unbiased17. Psychology differs substantially
from physics, and has many more ways in which exper-
imenter beliefs can influence their results18. However,
simple recording errors should presumably play the same
role in physics experiments where individual data points
can immediately be seen as favoring or disfavoring a hy-
pothesis.
III. CALCULATIONS
However, in many physics experiments, data can only
be seen as favoring or disfavoring a hypothesis after
lengthy calculations. This would seem to prevent record-
ing errors from being biased in any particular direction.
However, this will not save us from experimenter biases,
because errors then can occur in calculations, and just as
with the recording errors, will tend to favor experimenter
predispositions.
The first experiment to observe and quantitatively
measure the pressure due to light, by Nichols and Hull,
found agreement with Maxwell’s theory to within 1%.
However, Bell and Green later reanalyzed the data from
these experiments, and found several mathematical er-
rors: Nichols and Hull had used an incorrect value for the
mechanical equivalent of heat, had taken some logarithms
to base ten instead of base e, and made several mistakes
over units and conversion factors. Once these mistakes
were corrected, the results deviated from Maxwell’s the-
ory by 10%, which was still a success, but not nearly as
good as the original 1% agreement reported19. It seems
reasonable to think that Nichols and Hull, seeing such
good agreement with Maxwell’s theory, had been happy
to publish, but that if the mathematical errors had been
in the opposite direction, they would have checked over
their calculations more carefully.
More subtle errors occurred in the searches for free
quarks by Fairbank and his collaborators20. They mea-
sured the charges on several niobium spheres, obtaining
(−0.343±0.011)e, (0.001±0.033)e, and (+0.328±0.007)e,
in excellent agreement with the fractional charges of±e/3
expected for quarks. However, other experimenters failed
to find evidence of free quarks. The calculations needed
to turn Fairbank’s raw data into charges were quite com-
plex, and it was suggested that the Fairbank group might
have been unconsciously biased by their expectations
when doing them. The Fairbank group thus did a “blind”
analysis. To do this, they added a random offset to their
original data, and recalculated all charges without know-
ing the value of this offset. Only when all calculations
were completed was the offset revealed and removed.
When this was done, the calculated charges were instead
(+0.189 ± 0.02)e, and (+0.253 ± 0.02)e, which did not
agree with the quark model, or indeed, any major theo-
retical model. This case, and other cases of blind analysis
in physics, can be found in the book by Franklin20.
The effects of expectation bias can be particularly
3strong in cases where the physicists have a great deal
of freedom in their analysis, such as when “eyeballing”
fits. In the 1920’s, Millikan and Cameron ran experi-
ments on cosmic rays, to test Millikan’s theory of the
“birth cry of atoms,” which postulated that heavy ele-
ments were formed in the space between the stars21. Not
only was this theory false, but they analyzed their cos-
mic ray data with absorption formulae from Dirac that
were subsequently discovered to be in error. Neverthe-
less, Millikan and Cameron were able to obtain excellent
agreement between their experimental results, and the
“birth cry of atoms” theory! Their results gave quanti-
tatively precise agreement for the production of oxygen,
nitrogen, helium, and silicon, and they obtained rough
agreement for the production of iron22. They obtained
these results by measuring ionization from cosmic rays as
a function of depth, and then fitting by eye this absorp-
tion curve as a sum of three exponentials. But such a fit
gave them excessive freedom, so that their final results
for the coefficients and exponents of these three exponen-
tials, were essentially arbitrary.
Calculations influenced by the desire to obtain certain
results even date back to Newton’s Principia23 . New-
ton’s calculation of the speed of sound in air agreed with
experiment to within 0.1%. This calculation of the speed
of sound was based on the assumption that the the air un-
derwent isothermal compressions and expansions. How-
ever, correct treatment of sound in air requires treating
the compressions and expansions as adiabatic, so New-
ton should have obtained a speed of sound 15% too low.
It is often said that Newton did obtain a speed of sound
15% too low; see, for example Ref. [24]. But he did not:
he obtained results that agreed perfectly with the exper-
iments at the time! He did this by applying a number of
poorly-motivated “corrections” to his calculations, based
on quantities he could not possibly have known (and did
not know), such as the finite volume of space taken up
by air molecules, and the effects of the water vapor in
the air. He thus calculated corrections to the isothermal
result that magically achieved a 0.1% agreement with the
most recent experimental results available to him.
An interesting postscript appears in the later correc-
tion to Newton’s calculation of the speed of sound25,26,27.
Other scientists recognized Newton’s fudging for what it
was, and the discrepancy between the theoretical and
experimental results for the speed of sound remained an
outstanding problem for over 100 years. In the early
1800’s, Laplace, armed with recent experimental results
on specific heat capacities of gasses by Delaroche and Be-
rard, gave an adiabatic treatment of sound waves, deriv-
ing a speed of sound differing only 2.5% from experiment.
But not only did Laplace use the now-discredited caloric
theory in his determination of γ, but we now know that
the experimental results of Delaroche and Berard are 12%
off the corrent values28! The two errors ended up can-
celing, giving a spurious agreement. Here the agreement
seems to be fortuitous, rather than the result of bias.
IV. THE BANDWAGON EFFECT
In other cases, experimenter bias is clear, but it is
more difficult to identify precisely where the bias crept
in. When, in 1915, Einstein and de Haas performed the
first experiments measuring the gyromagnetic ratio of the
electron, they expected, on the basis of their models, to
find a g-factor of g = 1. We know today that the correct
value is roughly 2, yet Einstein and de Haas obtained
1.02± 0.1021! Around the same time, the American sci-
entist Barnett independently did two sets of experiments
on magnetism, and found g = 2.0, and g = 2.3. But after
hearing of the results of Einstein and de Haas, Barnett
repeated his experiments, and then reported that g was
between 1.1 and 1.4, stating that 1.0 was within his error
bars. Subsequent experiments by other groups did ob-
tain values closer to 2. However, de Haas, in three more
experiments in 1915 and 1923, continued to obtain values
significantly below 2 (1.2, 1.11, and 1.55). It seems clear
that Einstein, de Haas, and Barnett, were somehow influ-
enced by their expectations. A very enjoyable history of
this episode, as well as the already-mentioned Millikan
“birth cry of the atoms” episode, can be found in the
book by Galison21. Galison speculates that Einstein and
de Haas may have unintentionally corrected for system-
atic errors in a biased fashion, fixing systematic errors
that led to higher values of g, but leaving alone ones that
led to lower values of g.
A similar problem can be seen in the history graphs
produced by the Particle Data Group’sReview of Particle
Properties. This group produces a report of all physical
properties every two years, and their history graphs show
reports of certain particle properties as a function of the
year of their report. Ideally, the reported values should
be randomly scattered about the constant correct value.
However, some of the graphs show distinct trends with
time29. The 1980 Particle Data Group explained this as
follows30:
We show these figures not only to demonstrate that
there is not much change in these averages in the
usual case, but also to show that there exist cases
with relatively large changes. There is a psycholog-
ical danger in preparing tables of “right” answers.
The old joke about the experimenter who fights the
systematics until he or she get the “right” answer
(read “agrees with previous experiments”), and then
publishes, contains a germ of truth (presumably,
those who compile and average experimental results
are also not immune to this disease). A result can
disagree with the average of all previous experiments
by five standard deviations and still be right! Hence,
perhaps it is of value to show that large changes can
(and do) sometimes occur.
Franklin terms these time-dependent shifts and trends
“bandwagon effects,” and discusses a particularly dra-
matic case with | η+− |, the parameter that measures CP
violation31. As seen in Fig. 1, measurements of | η+− |
4FIG. 1: Measurements of | η+− | in order of their year of pub-
lication. Reprinted with permission from A. Franklin, “Forg-
ing, cooking, trimming, and riding on the bandwagon,” Am.
J. Phys. 52, 786-793 (1984), copyright 1984, American Asso-
ciation of Physics Teachers.
before 1973 are systematically different from those after
1973.
Henrion and Fischhoff graphed experimental reports
on the speed of light, as a function of the year of the ex-
periment. Their graph (Fig. 2) shows that experimental
results tend to cluster around a certain value for many
years, and then suddenly jump to cluster around a new
value, often many error bars from the previously accepted
value32. Two such jumps occur for the speed of light.
Again, the bias is clearly present in the graph, but the
exact mechanism by which it occured is harder to discern.
V. RESULTS THAT ARE TOO GOOD TO BE
TRUE
Newton’s results on the speed of sound, and Millikan
and Cameron’s results on cosmic rays, are in retrospect
too good to be true, because they were working with
deficient or incorrect theories. But even results that agree
with correct theories can be too good to be true.
Henrion and Fischhoff looked at the reported values
for a number of other fundamental constants, and with
one exception, found that error bars had been systemat-
ically underestimated—results were more spread about
the correct value than they should have been, based on
the reported error bars32. Underestimating error bars
is not necessarily a sign of experimenter bias. However,
their one exception is. Unlike the fundamental constants
such as h¯ or c, for which there are no theoretical cal-
culations to tell experimenters what to expect, experi-
ments measuring the ratio of the absolute ohm to the
ohm as maintained by the National Bureau of standards
(ΩABS/ΩNBS) “should” obtain one, if all calibrations
are correct. Henrion and Fischhoff found that the experi-
FIG. 2: Measurements of the speed of light, as a function of
the year of the experiment. Note that the vertical scale is
changed at 1900, to make the errors bars visible. Reprinted
with permission from M. Henrion and B. Fischhoff, “Assessing
uncertainty in physical constants,” Am. J. Phys. 54, 791-
798 (1986), copyright 1986, American Association of Physics
Teachers.
mental results for ΩABS/ΩNBS were too closely clustered
around one—given the error bars reported, the chance
was only 1 in 200 that the results would be so clustered
together. This indicates that experimenters, knowing
that they should obtain one, somehow biased their mea-
surements or calculations to get “the right answer.”
We depart briefly from physics to consider a famous
case from biology. Fisher’s reexamination of Mendel’s
results in his famous experiments on heredity in peas,
showed that Mendel’s results were simply too good to
be true. Many of his results show ratios that almost ex-
actly match the theoretical values, with deviations much
smaller than the expected statistical fluctuations. Fisher
showed that only 3 experiments in 100,000 would obtain
results as close to theory as Mendel’s33,34. This has often
been taken as proof of fraud, either on the part of Mendel,
or an assistant, but no evidence of fraud has been found,
other than the fact that the data is too good to be true.
As we have seen, such biases can arise in a number of ways
without intentional fraud. For example, Root-Bernstein
has shown that the results can be explained if Mendel
was unconsciously biased in cases where the assignation
of pea traits was ambiguous35. Olby has pointed out that
the results could be explained if Mendel kept track of the
ratios as he collected data, and stopped recording when
the ratios were what he expected36,37.
5VI. OTHER CASES
Experimenter biases can also arise from ambiguities in
when to discard data. If equipment was clearly malfunc-
tioning during a run, data can no longer be used. But
it will sometimes be unclear whether data should be dis-
carded, and in ambiguous cases, whether the data agrees
with expectations may unconsciously (or consciously) tip
the experimenter in one direction or another. One of
the most (in)famous cases is that of Millikan’s oil drop
experiments, where he both demonstrated the quantiza-
tion of charge, and measured this quantized charge39.
In his paper he claimed “It is to be remarked, too, that
this is not a selected group of drops but represents all of
the drops experimented on during 60 consecutive days. .
.”40. But later inspection of his lab notebook shows that
he threw out results for a number of oil drops, in many
cases after calculating their charge. For some oil drops
the equipment was clearly malfunctioning. For others,
the data failed certain consistency checks. And for a few
drops, Millikan simply discarded them because the calu-
lated charges were too far off from what he believed to be
the correct value. The exclusion of the latter data points
appears to cross the line into fraud, but the reasons used
to discard data form a continuum from obviously reason-
able to fraudulent, and illustrate the difficulty in deter-
mining when it is appropriate to discard data. (Fraud
is, of course, also a way in which experimenter beliefs
can influence their results, but discussion of such cases is
beyond the scope of this paper.)
Here we have only discussed the ways in which theoret-
ical beliefs can affect the actual results reported. Once
the results are reported, theoretical beliefs can also af-
fect how the results are interpreted, and whether they
are believed and/or published. We will not discuss such
cases here, except to note that it is not always easy to
separate the cases where theoretical beliefs have affected
the experiment, and when they have merely affected its
interpretation. The difficulty of this distinction is well-
illustrated by an episode in the development of the kinetic
theory of gasses.
In 1859 the scientific understanding of heat was still
uncertain, and the atomic picture for materials was still
controversial. Maxwell considered his now-famous model
of a gas as a collection of billiard balls (atoms) undergoing
elastic collisions, and came up with a startling result—
he showed that with this model, the viscosity of a gas
would be independent of its density38. This was sur-
prising, since he and his colleagues, naturally, expected
the viscosity to go to zero as the density went to zero.
Maxwell asked Stokes about this, and Stokes assured him
that experiments by Sabine on the damping of pendulums
in air had demonstrated that the viscosity of air went to
zero at low densities—apparently, a strong disconfirma-
tion of the billiard ball model! Nevertheless, Maxwell
continued his investigations, and eventually did exper-
iments showing that gas viscosity was constant over a
wide range of densities. With this triumph of the billiard
ball model, Stokes went back and reanalyzed Sabine’s
experiment. Stokes came to realize that, in fact, his pre-
vious analysis of Sabine’s experiment has implicitly as-
sumed that the viscosity was proportional to density at
low densities, thus assuming the result he claimed to be
proving. It could be argued that this is not a case where
theory affected reported experimental results, but merely
one where it affected the way in which results were in-
terpreted; but the line is blurry, for Stokes and Maxwell
both apparently believed that “the viscosity goes to zero
as the density goes to zero,” was the experimental result.
We have seen that there are a number of ways in which
the theoretical expectations of physicists can influence
their results. This bias is certainly less prominent than in
fields such as psychology and medicine, but it is clearly
present, and important if we want to understand how
physics works in practice. Finally, if the reader knows of
any cases of expectation bias, either historical or recent,
in their own fields, I’d love to hear about them!
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